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Learning from Thailand’s health reforms
Adrian Towse, Anne Mills, Viroj Tangcharoensathien
Providing all of Thailand’s population with subsidised health care required radical changes in the
health system
Thailand took a “big bang” approach to introducing
universal access to subsidised health care. In 2001, after
years of debate1–3 and slow progress,4 5 it extended cover-
age to 18.5 million people who were previously
uninsured (out of a population of 62million). This move
was combined with a radical shift in funding away from
major urban hospitals in order to build up primary care.
Such an approach has merits but also risks. We discuss
the implementation and some of the problems.
Formulating the change
Prime Minister Shinawatra obtained a landslide victory
for his Thai-Rak-Thai (Thais love Thais) Party in 2001
on a platform including the “30 baht treat all” scheme
for universal access to subsidised health care. Under
the scheme, people pay 30 baht (£0.50, €0.7, $0.86) for
each visit or admission.
Thailand previously had four public risk protection
schemes (box 1) with widely differing benefits and con-
tribution levels. These schemes protected a total 43.5
million people, leaving 18.5 million paying fees for
care from public or private providers.
The initial plan was to merge resources from the
four schemes into one universal coverage scheme to
remove overlaps in coverage and improve equity. This
met resistance from government departments running
the other schemes and from civil servants and trades
unionists benefiting from the two employment based
schemes. The government therefore decided to fund
the 30 baht scheme by pooling the Ministry of Public
Health budgets for public hospitals, other health facili-
ties, and the low income and voluntary health card
schemes and providing some additional money. This
could be done without legislation, enabling progress to
be made while legislation was prepared and debated.
The National Health Security Act was passed by
parliament in November 2002, creating new institu-
tions to regulate the quality and financial elements of
the scheme. It preserves all benefit entitlements for
members of the civil service and social security
schemes but places management of their financing
with the National Health Security Office, which runs
the 30 baht scheme. The act allows for the civil service
and social security schemes to be merged into a single
universal coverage scheme by decree should that
become politically acceptable in the future.
Factors required for implementation
In low and middle income countries, government
capacity is often a key constraint on the design and
implementation of policy change.6 7 In Thailand, previ-
ous experience and investment in health care was
essential for implementation of the universal coverage
scheme.
Over several decades, comprehensive healthcare
coverage had been achieved through developing infra-
structure in rural areas, where two thirds of Thailand’s
Box 1: Public risk protection schemes
Civil servants medical benefit scheme—introduced in the 1960s for civil servants
and their dependants
Low income card scheme—introduced in the 1970s, providing free care to low
income families and individuals, elderly people, children under 12 years,
and people with disabilities
Voluntary health card scheme—predominantly rural; introduced in the 1980s
and funded through equal matching of household and Ministry of Public
Health payments
Social security scheme—introduced in the 1990s; it protects workers only and
is mandatory for all private firms with more than one employeeTables showing the costs of health care are on bmj.com
The Hai healthcare system is dominated by hospitals
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population lives. Although beds (public and private)
and doctors are concentrated in Bangkok, successive
governments have built up primary care health centres
(which do not have doctors or beds) in all subdistricts
and community hospitals (10-120 beds) in more than
90% of districts. In addition, an effective administrative
system meant that 45 million people could be
registered for the universal coverage scheme within
four months.
Experience had also been gained in managing
insurance schemes, especially relating to payment
mechanisms in urban areas where provider choice is
available.Although retrospective fee for service payment
in the civil service scheme encouraged increased costs,
the social security scheme provided a successful
capitation model.8 Employees choose a public or private
hospital, which receives an annual capitation payment,
and provides care directly or subcontracts to primary
care. The capitation approach encouraged the develop-
ment of competing provider networks and contained
costs while still permitting choice of public or private
provider (the market share of the public sector fell from
83% in 1991 to 41% in 2001).
The low income card scheme provided experience
of resource allocation and of case based payment in
rural areas. Under this scheme, a global budget was
allocated to provinces based on the numbers of regis-
tered beneficiaries, weighted by health needs. A
reinsurance premium of 2.5% was deducted from the
allocations to pay for cross boundary services and high
cost care for patients. Hospitals were paid on a per
capita or weighted diagnosis related group basis.
During the 1990s, research capacity in health
economics and financing had been systematically built
up in the Health Systems Research Institute through
doctoral study and workplace training. This provided
the basis for formulating an evidence based policy and
developed skills in interfacing research and policy. In
addition, public health advocates and leaders were active
at senior levels of the bureaucracy and were therefore
able to take the political imperative and translate it into
effective action. It is still unclear, however, whether the
scale of the reform undertaken by the Thai government
is manageable within its capacity.
Cost of universal care
Estimating the financial implications of universal care
and setting capitation rates has been contentious.9 10
Some analysts propose a capitation rate as high as 1500
baht.11 In fiscal year 2002, the government used a per
capita rate of 1202 baht (see bmj.com for calculation
details). A rate of 1414 baht was set for 2003. A key issue
in setting this was compliance—the extent to which
patients use their registered provider rather than
another (in which case they must pay themselves). The
2003 figure assumed 85% compliance for outpatients
and 100% for inpatients. Compliance rates also have
implications for the revenue of public hospitals from
user fees. Before universal coverage was introduced,
public hospitals received 20-50% of their income from
user fees. The total health budget for 2002 was 51bn
baht. Comparable figures for spending in earlier years
are difficult to identify, but spend has not increased to
the same extent as the number of people covered.
The per capita allocations for 2002 and 2003
resulted in many provinces and hospitals having deficit
budgets. This partly reflected the previous geographical
funding imbalance relative to population. Rather than
phase in the new formula, a contingency fund of 10%
(5bn baht) was set up to relieve hospitals in 2002. How-
ever, because of fiscal constraints and evidence of low
compliance among universal coverage beneficiaries, no
contingency fund is planned for 2003. It is too early to
tell if this will give rise to problems. Teaching and other
supertertiary hospitals have been particularly affected
by the financial redistribution. Although some special
provision has been made, a separate stream of funding
for teaching and research activities may be required.
If the universal coverage scheme relies totally on
general taxation and the capitation rate is not adjusted
to reflect costs and usage, the quality of care and
confidence in the scheme could deteriorate. Various
options are available to manage the financial pressures
generated. These include:
x Changing the benefit package (this would be
politically difficult)
x Collecting contributions from beneficiaries through
higher copayments (for higher income users or for
some services) or some kind of social insurance contri-
bution or separate tax (the National Health Security
Act provides for this)
x Expanding the social security scheme to include
spouses and dependants so reducing the numbers
covered by the 30 baht scheme.
Strengthening primary care
The universal coverage scheme combines capitation
funding with a shift to delivery led by primary care to
help keep costs under control. A typical province will
have five to seven district primary care networks, each
led by a contractor unit (see box 2) with one or two
networks in the provincial city. This is a radical change
from the social security scheme, which uses large hos-
pitals (over 100 beds) as the main contractor.When the
social security scheme was set up, primary curative care
was largely delivered in hospital outpatient depart-
ments or by government doctors working out of hours
in private clinics.6
Box 2: Key elements of healthcare provision under the 30 baht
scheme
• The contractor unit for primary care is contracted by the province to be
the main deliverer of health care to its registered population; individuals
must register with it
• Primary care units (health centres and units set up in hospitals to provide
primary care) are assigned to deliver primary health care
• A typical rural contractor unit network comprises a district hospital with
all health centres in the district. In urban areas it is the provincial or tertiary
care hospital with several urban health centres
• The contractor unit receives a capitated budget to provide comprehensive
primary care services to its registered population
• Patients can access either the health centres or the hospital associated
with their contractor unit. Referrals can then take place to other hospitals
• Inpatient care is reimbursed from a provincial budget based on a weight
of the diagnosis related group, adjusted for location (eg, community or
provincial hospital)
• Patients who do not use their assigned providers must pay the cost
themselves
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For the hospital dominated Thai healthcare system,
the emphasis on primary care in the universal scheme
represents a bold departure. Initial problems included a
shortage of doctors to staff primary care units,
necessitating use of hospital doctors in rotation, and
little attention being paid to preventive and health pro-
motion services.High level policymakers have so far not
been prepared to put the necessary staff management
mechanisms in place to support redeployment. Little
attention has been paid to the role of provinces in pur-
chasing and monitoring quality of care and to the
importance of giving people choice of contractor. Very
limited private sector participation is allowed, even in
urban areas where a large private sector exists.
Will the reform benefit the right people?
Before the latest reforms, the Thai healthcare system
was notoriously inequitable. Public expenditure
(health, education, and public infrastructure) has
favoured middle income over poorer families because
of their greater use of public services,12 the extensive
reliance on user fees, and the inequitable pattern of
public subsidies.13 A recent study indicates that
expenditure on district hospitals benefits poorer
people more than expenditure on provincial and
teaching hospitals (P Hanvoravongchai et al, paper
presented at Manila meeting, May 2003).
A survey shortly after introduction of universal
coverage found that those in the lowest income fifth
were spending 7.5% of their income on health
compared with an average of 1.6% and 0.1% for those
in the social security and civil service schemes.14 This
suggests that the scheme has not yet provided effective
financial protection.14
Compliance rates are low (see table A on bmj.com).
One interpretation is that the scheme is not giving
people access to their preferred providers. However,
compliance rates are higher than in the early years of
the social security scheme and show a satisfactory
income gradient, suggesting that richer groups are self
selecting out of the universal coverage scheme.
Moreover, bypassing primary care to tertiary provin-
cial hospitals has hitherto been routine, and it will take
time to gain patient confidence in the quality of
primary care. A Ministry of Public Health report has
found the ambulatory caseload in tertiary provincial
hospitals has decreased since the scheme began.14
Conclusions
The Thai policy is a bold reform driven by top level
political imperatives and incorporating many innovative
features.However, the approach has carried with it many
problematic side effects, including driving major
reforms in healthcare delivery through changing
financing mechanisms. A continued emphasis on moni-
toring, evaluation, and research will be vital in fine
tuning the reforms.Major revisions may need to be con-
sidered if the policy is to survive. These include allowing
greater patient choice, providing greater opportunity for
private sector participation and competition in urban
areas, strengthening further the rural district health sys-
tem with adequate clinical staff, protecting key national
functions such as teaching and research, and expanding
the sources of finance beyond general taxation.
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Summary points
Thailand combined the introduction of universal access to subsidised
health care with a radical shift in funding away from urban hospitals
to primary care
Implementation was facilitated by strong political imperative and
previous experience from existing health schemes
Redirection of funds to primary care left many hospitals with large
deficits
Staff need to be redeployed to primary care units, which are still
underdeveloped
Patients are used to accessing care from hospitals and choosing their
provider
Confidence in primary care needs building, and the scheme may
have to be modified to permit more choice and raise more funding
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